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NOTES
Are 'Ilojan Horse Union Organizers "Employees"?: A
New Look at Deference to the NLRB's Interpretation of
NLRA Section 2(3)
Jonathan D. Hacker
INTRODUCTION

Labor unions traditionally have depended on direct and continuous contact with employees in the workplace in order to organize
effectively.1 The Supreme Court, however, has recently limited the
circumstances under which the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board) can order companies to grant nonemployee
union organizers access to their property to commurucate with employees.2 According to the Court, the right to union organization
protected by section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act3
(NLRA or Act) applies only to employees, not to nonemployee
organizers.
Despite this holding, unions may be able to maintain direct and
continuous contact with employees through the use of a so-called
trojan horse organizer - a full-time, paid union organizer who applies for a job with a company with the specific and sole intent of
organizing a union there.4 This strategy has many benefits for un1. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 305, 326-30 (1994).
2. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539 (1992) (holding that the Board may
order an employer to grant access "only where 'the location of a plant and the living quarters
of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them'" (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351U.S.105, 113 (1956))). See
generally Estlund, supra note 1, at 319 ("In [Lechmere], the Court ruled six to three that
'nonemployee union organizers' virtually never have the right to enter private property to
communicate with unorganized employees.").
3. Section 7 provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations •.••" 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
4. This strategy is also called "salting." Unions such as the International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, the International Ladies'" Garment Workers Union, and the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers have used this technique in their organizing efforts. See
Stephen M. Crow & Sandra J. Hartman, The Fate of Full-Time, Paid Union Organizers as
Employees: Anorher Nail in the Union Coffin?, 44 LAB. L.J. 30, 30-32 (1993); Herbert R.
Northrup, "Salting" the Contractors' Labor Force: Construction Unions Organizing With
NLRB Assistance, 14 J. LAB. REs. 469 (1993); see also Judd H. Lees, Hiring the Trojan Horse:
The Union Business Agent as a Protected Applicant, 42 LAB. L.J. 814 (1991) (describing practice of and law concerning trojan horse organizing strategy). After Lechmere, other unions,
including retail industry unions such as the United Food and Commercial Workers Union,
which previously had relied to a great extent on access to store parking lots, may well look to
trojan horse organizers to mitigate the effects of Lechmere. This method seems especially
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ions: it provides the union day-to-day access to employees; it provides the union access to information about the work environment
and employment practices at the company; and it allows the paid
union organizer to lead and control employee organizing activities,
reducing the exposure of other employees to the illegal discharges
that often chill organizing drives.s
The effectiveness of this strategy, however, would be severely
undermined if an employer could refuse to hire a trojan horse organizer simply because she works for the union, or if the employer
could fire the organizer once her true intentions are uncovered.
Employers seeking to keep their workforces union-free obviously
do not want to hire union organizers. But if these organizers are
employees as defined by section 2(3) of the NLRA, then employers
cannot refuse to hire such organizers solely on the grounds that
they are interested in organizing the workforce. Section 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA protects employees - a category that includes job applicants6 - from anti-union discrimination.7 Under this provision,
an employer may not refuse to hire an applicant solely because of
the applicant's union affiliation.8 If an individual is not an employee
appropriate for organizing in the retail food industry, in which turnover is high and job qualifications are minimal.
The description "trojan horse organizer" has been used by management advocates as a
way of highlighting the "threat" these organizers pose to management. See, e.g., Lees, supra.
This Note argues to the contrary that such organizers in fact do not pose a legally cognizable
threat to employers and concludes that such organizers should be protected under the
NLRA. This Note nevertheless uses the phrase "trojan horse organizers" because it is colorfully accurate in the sense that these organizers join the workforce in order to unionize it, an
objective most employers do in fact oppose. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
5. Professor Paul Weiler has documented the serious detrimental effects of employer unfair labor practices (ULPs) on union organizing campaigns. PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING
nm WORKPLACE 112-14, 237-41 {1990); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'
Rights to Self-Organizatum Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1769 (1983). Weiler attributes the overall decline in union organization in the United States in part to an increase in
ULPs by employers and to the lack of effective remedies for employer ULPs. Although
others have contested his findings, see, e.g., Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard
Times for Unions: Another Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L.
REv. 953 (1991}, even these commentators make clear that employer ULPs have had negative effects on union organization. See id. at 994; see also Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for
Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1015, 1028 (1991) ("On their
face [LaLonde and Meltzer's] numbers seem to state a rather compelling case for labor law
reform.").
6. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1941).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a}{3} {1988). An employer charged with having an anti-union motive
in refusing to hire an individual must prove that it would have refused to hire the individual
even in the absence of the anti-union motive. See Wright Line Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083
{1980), enforced, NLRB v. Wright Line Co., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981}, cert. denied, 455
U.S. 989 (1982); see also NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 {1983)
(approving Wright Line).
8. Nor can employers fire or otherwise take action against an employee on the basis of
union affiliation. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a}(3} (1988). For the sake of convenience, this Note will
consider the trojan horse question as a refusal to hire situation, although the analysis applies
equally to other forms of employer action against an employee.

774

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:772

as defined by section 2(3), however, an employer may legitimately
refuse to hire her solely for anti-union reasons.9 Thus, if trojan
horse union organizers are not considered employees under section
2(3), then employers have no legal worries about their motives in
refusing to hire these applicants.
NLRA section 2(3) provides the following definition of

employee:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be
limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise ... but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service
of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by
his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an· independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or
any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is
not an employer as herein defined.10

For over twenty years the NLRB has held that this definition includes trojan horse union organizers.11 Courts, however, have not
uniformly accepted this position.12 The Fourth,13 Sixth,14 and most recently - Eighth1s 'Circuits have refused to consider such
organizers bona fide employees entitled to the Act's protection. In
contrast, the Second,16 Third,17 and D.c.1s Circuits have enforced
9. For example, § 2(3) expressly excludes supervisors from the definition of employee. 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988). The Act therefore allows employers to fire supervisors for supporting a union organizing drive.
10. 29 u.s.c. § 152(3) {1988).
11. See, e.g., Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224 {1992); Escada (USA) Inc., 304
N.LR.B. 845, 845 n.4 (1991), enforced, 970 F.2d 898 {3d Cir. 1992); 299 Lincoln Street, Inc.,
292 N.L.R.B. 172, 180 {1988); Multimatic Prods., Inc., 288 N.LR.B. 1279, 1313 n.226 {1988);
Pilliod of Miss., Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 799, 811 {1985); Palby Lingerie, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 176,
182 {1980); Lyndale Mfg. Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. 1281, 1283 n.3 {1978); Anthony Forest Prods.
Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 976, 977-78 {1977); Oak Apparel, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 701 {1975); Dee Knitting Mills, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 1041 {1974), enforced, 538 F.2d 312 {2d Cir. 1975).
12. For a summary of most of the recent case law, see Malcolm A.H. Stewart, Status of
Paid Union-Organizers as "Employees" Under the National Labor Relations Act: Sunland
Construction Co. and Town & Country Electric, 35 B.C. L. REv. 351 {1994).
13. See Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB, 18 F.3d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1994);
H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 72-73 {4th Cir. 1989). See generally Lees, supra note
4 (approving of Zachry); John Mark Tarver, Note, H.B. Zachry Co. v. N.L.R.B.: Paid FullTune Union Organizer Not an "Employee," 50 LA. L. REv.1211 {1990) (criticizing Zachry).
14. See NLRB v. Elias Bros. Big Boy, Inc., 327 F.2d 421, 427 (6th Cir. 1964).
15. See Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 628-29 {8th Cir. 1994), cert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 933 (1995).
16. See NLRB v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., 599 F.2d 26, 30 {2d Cir. 1979).
17. See Escada (USA) Inc. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1992), enforcing 304 N.L.R.B.
845 {1991).
18. See Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 1329-31 (D.C. Cir. 1992}, cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1252 {1993).
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Board orders finding that an employer who refused to hire a paid
union organizer had committed an unfair labor practice.
The framework established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council19 typically guides courts adjudicating
disputes involving agency interpretations of statutes.2 0 Chevron establishes a two-step process through which courts assess interpretations of statutes by agencies such as the NLRB.21 The Chevron rule
of deference to agencies turns on statutory ambiguity. If the statute
clearly expresses Congress's intent, then courts do not defer to the
agency's interpretation of the statute; they simply enforce the statute's clear meaning.22 If the statute is not clear, however, courts
then move to the second step and defer to the agency's interpretation as long as it is reasonable.23
Although the Chevron framework is supposed to simplify the
process of interpreting statutes in the administrative state,24 courts,
Board members, and commentators have employed the framework
in a variety of ways to answer the question whether section 2(3)
includes trojan horse organizers. One approach suggests that courts
should stop at Chevron step one and enforce Board orders protecting trojan horse organizers, on the ground that section 2(3) clearly
includes trojan horse organizers.25 Another approach suggests the
opposite: courts should stop at step one but refuse to enforce the
Board's protection of trojan horse organizers, on the ground that
19. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
20. For comprehensive discussions of Chevron and its implications, see Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE LJ. 969 (1992} and Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2071 (1990}.
21. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S.
112, 123 (1987) (applying the Chevron two-step framework to an NLRB interpretation of the
NLRA).
22. See 467 U.S. at 842-43.
23. See 467 U.S. at 842-43.
24. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DuKE LJ. 511 (defending Chevron as superior to the previous case-by-case, multifactor
approach).
25. See Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1231-32 (1992) (Member Oviatt, concurring). Oviatt had dissented from an earlier Board decision that protected a trojan horse
organizer as an employee under § 2(3). See Escada (USA) Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 845, 845-46
(1991), enforced, 970 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1992). In Sunland, however, Oviatt offered a different
view:
I have considered the possibility that the law permits me sufficient flexibility to apply to
this case my own view of what should be wise national labor policy which, upon reflection, was what underlay my dissent in Escada. I do not now believe that I have that
flexibility. . • • In my opinion, the legislative materials and Supreme Court decisions
interpreting those materials simply do not provide support for a policy judgment to exclude union organizers from the definition of "employee." It is thus my view that I lack
authority to exclude paid union organizers from the definition of "employee" in Section
2(3) on policy grounds. And I find it abundantly clear ••• that paid union organizers are
"employees" within the ordinary meaning of that word. Accordingly, I believe that if
paid union organizers are now to be excluded, Congress must say so explicitly.
309 N.L.R.B. at 1232.
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section 2(3) clearly excludes trojan horse organizers.26 Other approaches find that the statute is not clear but reach contrary conclusions on whether the Board's inclusion of trojan horse organizers is
a reasonable interpretation of the statute.27
This Note takes a different approach to interpreting section
2(3). Although this Note agrees that section 2(3) neither clearly
includes nor clearly excludes trojan horse organizers, it also argues
that the definition of employee under section 2(3) must be determined by looking to common law principles of agency. In other
words, the question whether courts should defer to the Board's interpretation of section 2(3) does not turn on statutory ambiguity.
Rather, courts have a continuing duty to ensure that the Board interprets employee consistently with common law agency principles.
Nevertheless, the correct interpretation of employee under agency
principles ultimately turns on an empirical judgment about whether
trojan horse organizers generally work as hard as other employees.
This judgment is uniquely suited to the NLRB, whose experience
and expertise with the complexities of industrial relations the Court
has consistently recognized. This Note therefore concludes that
courts should defer to Board orders protecting trojan horse organizers, not on the basis of statutory ambiguity, but because the
Board is best equipped to make the judgments necessary to reach
the proper legal conclusion under the principles of agency. 28
26. See H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that "the plain
meaning of the term 'employee' contemplates an employee working under the direction of a
single employer," but not citing Chevron).
27. Compare Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 1330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
("We hold, then, that the NLRB could reasonably determine that Hendrix or anyone else who
is employed simultaneously by a union and a company is an 'employee' under § 2(3) of the
Act .••• " (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 1252 (1993) with Town & Country Elec.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 627-29 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that the "statute does not helpfully
define 'employee,' " and that the court "will uphold the Board's interpretation only if it is
reasonable" but refusing to do so), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct 933 (1995).
It may be somewhat inaccurate, however, to characterize either opinion as a strict appli·
cation of Chevron's second step. After invoking Chevron, Willmar spends the next seven
paragraphs - the entirety of its analysis - demonstrating why the statute's language, history, and purposes cover trojan horse union organizers. 968 F.2d at 1329-30. Such analysis
seems to suggest that the statute is clear at Chevron's step one. Nonetheless, the opinion
upholds the NLRB's interpretation as reasonable, an apparent invocation of Chevron's second step. Town & Country, on the other hand, never even cites Chevron; nevertheless, the
structure of the opinion seems consistent with the Chevron two-step framework. The opinion
finds that the statute is unclear, 34 F.3d at 628 ("Section 2(3)'s definition of 'employee,'
provides little help in deciding the issue before us."), and assesses the Board's interpretation
under a standard of reasonableness, see 34 F.3d at 627.
28. It is possible to articulate this argument in Chevron terms, as follows: Although the
statute is clear in the sense that it requires that employee be interpreted according to agency
principles, the statute is ambiguous in the sense that the proper application of agency princi·
pies is unclear. Thus, courts should proceed to Chevron's step two and defer to the NLRB's
application of agency principles, so long as it is reasonable; it is reasonable for the NLRB to
conclude that trojan horse organizers are employees under agency principles because the
Board has the experience and expertise necessary to make that judgment.
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Part I of this Note examines the language and history of section
2(3), demonstrating that Congress intended for the Board and the
courts to apply common law agency principles when interpreting
this section. Part II identifies three problems for trojan horse organizers that arise under agency law. First, trojan horse organizers
may be subject to the control of the union, which would mean they
are not employees under traditional agency principles. But the
union may only control the organizer with respect to legal organizing activities; the employer controls the organizer with respect to
any legitimate on-the-job responsibilities. Second, trojan horse organizers have an interest in union organizing that directly conflicts
with the employer's interest in avoiding unionization, a conflict of
interest that would also negate the organizer's status as an employee under agency principles. Such a conflict, however, is not a
relevant conflict under the NLRA because the statute is predicated
on the view that an individual may be interested in organizing and
still be loyal to an employer. A third problem that arises under
agency law involves the question whether trojan horse organizers
are generally good employees. This question is an empirical one,
and Part III argues that the NLRB has the experience and expertise
necessary to answer it. This Note concludes that courts should
therefore enforce NLRB orders protecting trojan horse organizers
as employees under section 2(3).
I.

INTERPRETING SECTION 2(3) - COMMON LAW
AGENCY PRINCIPLES

Statutory interpretation generally begins with the text of the
statute.29 As noted above, NLRA section 2(3) does not provide a
precise definition of employee. Instead, the Act simply defines employee as "any employee," subject to a limited number of exemptions.3o Under the interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio
The problem with the Chevron version of the argument is that at step two courts almost
never reverse agency interpretations. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaldng in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEXAS L.
REv. 83, 95-96 (1994). By contrast, this Note argues that courts should defer to the NLRB's
interpretation of§ 2(3) only because the Board has experience and expertise with respect to
a policy judgment intertwined in the particular agency law question at issue. Determination
of the employee status of other individuals under agency law, on the other hand, may not
require the kind of policy judgments that are necessary in the trojan horse organizer case. In
other words, this Note does not argue that courts should simply throw up their hands when
reviewing Board interpretations of § 2(3), as seems to be the current judicial practice at
Chevron step two.
29. Pennsylvania Dept of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990).
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text According to the Supreme Court, "The breadth of § 2(3)'s definition is striking: the Act squarely
applies to 'any employee.' The only limitations are specific exemptions." Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984).
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alterius, 31 the explicit list of exemptions suggests that Congress intended to exclude all other possible exemptions. The expressio
unius approach to section 2(3) would include any individual not
specifically exempted by the language of the provision.32 Because
section 2(3) does not expressly exclude trojan horse organizers, this
approach would dictate that such organizers must be considered
employees under the statute.33
There is no need to resort to this interpretive canon, however,
because Congress actually specified substantive content for the
meaning of employee. 34 The Taft-Hartley amendments to section
2(3) make clear that Congress intended the definition of employee
to have a meaning consistent with common law agency principles.3s
Taft-Hartley amended section 2(3) to add to the exemptions
from the definition of employee "any individual having the status of
an independent contractor."36 This amendment was an express rejection of the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 31 in which the Court construed section 2(3) broadly to
include individuals who have some of the characteristics of independent contractors.38 In his summary of the conference committee agreement, Senator Taft stated:
31. See BLACK'S LA.w DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990} ("Under [expressio unius], if a
statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain
provision, other exceptions ... are excluded."}. See generally 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, Sum.
ERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (6th ed. 1992) (describing the expressio unius
canon). The Supreme Court has applied the expressio unius canon specifically to § 2(3). See
Sure-Tan, 461 U.S. at 891-92.
32. In Sure-Tan, for example, the Court held that undocumented aliens are employees,
primarily because § 2(3) does not include undocumented aliens among the exemptions from
the definition of employee. 461 U.S. at 892. See infra note 35.
33. The NLRB has relied on this reasoning in concluding that trojan horse organizers are
employees under § 2(3). See Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1226 (1992) (" 'Paid
union organizers' do not appear in [§ 2(3)'s] exclusions. Under the well settled principle of
statutory construction - expressio unius est exclusio alterius - only these enumerated clas·
sifications are excluded from the definition of 'employee.' Accordingly, full-time, paid union
organizers are 'employees' within the ordinary meaning of this provision." (footnote
omitted)).
34. See SINGER, supra note 31, § 47.23 ("[Expressio unius] is a rule of statutory construction and not a rule of law. Thus, it can be overcome by a strong indication of contrary
legislative intent or policy."); Merrill, supra note 20, at 988 ("Canons are maxims or rules of
thumb that allow courts to impute answers to interpretive questions when it is not possible to
discern by more direct means what the legislature intended.").
35. The Court's decision in Sure-Tan that undocumented aliens are included within § 2(3)
because they are not expressly excluded, 467 U.S. at 892, is consistent with the requirement
that§ 2(3) be interpreted according to agency principles. Nothing in the law of agency makes
undocumented alien status relevant to defining employee. Thus, undocumented aliens could
only have been excluded from the definition if the statute expressly excluded them.
36. Labor-Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, sec. 101, § 2(3), 61 Stat. 136,
138 (1947).
37. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
38. See 322 U.S. at 126-29.
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The conferees also adopted language in the House bill excluding from
the definition of "employee" individuals having [the] status of independent contractors. While the Board itself has never claimed that
independent contractors were employees, the Supreme Court has ...
held that the ordinary tests of the law of agency could be disregarded
by the Board in determining if petty occupational groups were "employees" within the meaning of the Labor Relations Act. The Court
consequently refused to consider the question whether certain categories of persons whom the Board had deemed to be "employees"
might not, as a matter of law, have been independent contractors.
The legal effect of the amendment therefore is merely to make it clear
that the question whether or not a person is an employee is always a
question of law, since the term is not meant to embrace persons outside
that category under the general principles of the law of agency. 39

Similarly, in the conference report discussing the amendment, Congress made clear its intent with respect to the meaning of employee:
It must be presumed that when Congress passed the Labor Act, it
intended words it used to have the meanings that they had when Congress passed the act, not new meanings that, 9 years later, the Labor
Board might think up. In the law, there has always been a difference,
and a big difference, between "employees" and "independent contractors." ... It is inconceivable that Congress, when it passed the act,
authorized the Board to give to every word in the act whatever meaning it wished. On the contrary, Congress intended then, and it intends
now, that the Board give to words not far-fetched meanings but ordinary meanings.40

The history of the Taft-Hartley amendment to section 2(3) thus
demonstrates that employee is not to be defined solely with reference to the listed exemptions. Rather: Congress intended employee
to have a meaning consistent with its ordinary meaning at law.41
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the significance
of the congressional reaction to Hearst Publications, interpreting it
39. 93 CoNo. REc. 6441-42 (1947) (emphasis added).
40. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947); see also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1947) (noting that the Supreme Court in Hearst Publications had
held that the Board could ignore the law of agency in defining employee to include independent contractors, and explaining that Congress meant effectively to reverse this opinion).
41. The fact that the conference report refers to "ordinary meanings" rather than "ordinary common law meanings" does not indicate that Congress intended meanings possibly
inconsistent with the common law - like dictionary definitions - to apply. Compare H.B.
Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1989) (interpreting the meaning of employee
without reference to the common law) with Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327,
1329 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("[T]he NLRA ..• failed to indicate rejection of the common law
model."), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1252 (1993). The committee was rejecting the tendency of
the Board and the Court to ignore the common law in defining employee. Senator Taft spoke
of the need for the Board and the courts to interpret the meaning of employee under general
principles of agency. Moreover, the conference committee focused on the difference in the
law between independent contractors and employees. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the committee intended for the Board and the courts to return to the common law
as the basis for defining employee.
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as requiring the application of common law agency principles to the
definition of employee in section 2(3). In ULRB v. United Insurance Co. of America,42 for example, the Court stated that "[t]he
obvious purpose of [the amendment to section 2(3)] was to have the
Board and the courts apply general agency principles in distinguishing between employees and independent contractors. " 43 Of course,
it is possible to interpret Congress's reaction to Hearst Publications
as solely limited to resolving the distinction between employees and
independent contractors, but the Court has interpreted the TaftHartley amendment to section 2(3) more broadly. In Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 44 the Court rejected a Board decision that included retirees within the meaning of
employee under section 2(3), even though retirees are not among
the specified exemptions from the section. The Court noted that
"the legislative history of § 2(3) itself indicates that the term 'employee' is not to be stretched beyond its plain meaning embracing
only those who work for another for hire"45 and concluded that the
"ordinary meaning of 'employee' does not include retired workers;
retired employees have c~ased to work for another for hire."46
Although the Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass did not expressly
invoke agency law to delineate the "ordinary meaning" of employee, 41 the Court has since highlighted the central role of agency
principles in the interpretation of section 2(3). In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 48 the Court stated that after Hearst
Publications, "Congress amended the statute ... to demonstrate that
the usual common-"law principles were the keys to meaning. "49 The
Court in Darden also endorsed the view that "'[w]hen Congress
has used the term "employee" without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional masterservant relationship as understood by common-law agency doc42. 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
43. 390 U.S. at 256.
44. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
45. 404 U.S. at 166; see also 404 U.S. at 167-68 (citing legislative authorities cited supra in
note 40).
46. 404 U.S. at 168. Of course, the "plain meaning [of employee] embracing only those
who work for another for hire," 404 U.S. at 166, also might appear to exclude individuals in
the category of job applicants, which the Court has long held to be included in § 2(3), see
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 182-87 (1941). The Court in Phelps Dodge
recognized, however, that the Act's proscription of "discrimination in regard to hire," 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988), requires that applicants be protected. See 313 U.S. at 185-86.
47. The Court's decision in Pittsburgh Plate Glass was, however, completely consistent
with agency principles. Retired workers are not subject to the control of the employer and
therefore are not agents at common law. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text
(describing the definition of employee under agency principles).
48. 112 s. Ct. 1344 (1992).
49. 112 S. Ct. at 1349 (emphasis added); see Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d
1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1252 (1993).
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trine.' "50 The Board51 and several courts52 have since relied on
Darden in construing section 2(3)'s definition of employee according to common law principles.s3
Thus, although trojan horse organizers are not expressly excluded from the definition of employee in section 2(3), it does not
follow that they must be included. Clear and direct legislative history and Supreme Court precedent indicate that the determination
whether a trojan horse organizer is an employee under section 2(3)
turns on whether such an organizer would be considered an agent
of the nonunion employer at common law.
II.

AGENCY PRINCIPLES AND THE TROJAN HORSE
ORGANIZER QUESTION

The common law uses agency principles to define the employeeemployer relationship.54 According to the Restatement of Agency,
control is the central defining characteristic of that relationship
50. 112 S. Ct at 1348 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 739-40 (1989)). Although Congress did in fact provide a nominal definition of employee
in § 2(3), the definition of employee as "any employee" except for certain specified exclusions is unhelpful in the sense that courts still must determine which individuals fall within
the category of "any employee."
51. Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1227 (1992).
52. Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. granted,
115 S. Ct 933 (1995); Willmar, 968 F.2d at 1329.
53. It is possible to criticize Darden on the ground that even if Congress generally intends
for courts to use common law principles in defining employee, Chevron seems to suggest that
when a statute also creates an administrative agency like the NLRB, such ambiguous terms
are to be left to the agency for interpretation. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); see also supra notes 19-24 and accompanying
text (discussing Chevron's deference principle). Thus Darden's dicta might appear to apply
only when a statute's use of employee is not subject to administrative interpretation. In the
case of§ 2(3), in other words, perhaps courts should not refer to the common law but instead
defer to the NLRB's interpretation.
As demonstrated above, however, the specific history of § 2(3) indicates that Congress
did not intend to leave the interpretation of the ambiguous term employee to the NLRB,
even though the Board is the agency responsible for enforcement of the statute. Congress
specifically intended to require that courts ensure that the Board employ common law
agency principles when interpreting § 2(3). As leading commentators have recognized, in
amending § 2(3), "Congress manifested an intention not only to narrow the scope of the
Board's jurisdiction and the reach of the Act but also to curb the power of the Board in
relation to that of the judiciary." ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 103 (11th ed. 1991). In short, Chevron simply does not affect the responsibility of
the courts to ensure that the Board interprets § 2(3) consistently with the common law. This
Note does conclude, however, that proper application of common law principles of agency
depends on the experience and expertise of the Board in administering the relationship between union organizers and employers, and that courts should therefore defer on that
ground. See infra Part III.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 25 (1957) ("The rules applicable generally to
principal and agent as to the creation of the relation, delegability and capacity of the parties
apply to master and servant."). The Supreme Court refers to the Restatement of Agency as
the guiding source of the common law of agency. See, e.g., Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 n.31 (1989) ("In determining whether a hired party is an
employee under the general common law of agency, we have traditionally looked for guid-

782

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:772

under agency law: "A servant is an agent employed by a master to
perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to
control by the master."55 Under agency law a servant may be under
the control of two independent masters simultaneously, so long as
service to one master does not require the abandonment of service
to the other master.56 This principle is definitional: A person "cannot be a servant of two masters in doing an act as to which an intent
to serve one necessarily excludes an intent to serve the other.,'57
Thus, even if a potential agent is subject to the control of independent masters, she will only be considered the agent for the one she
truly intends to serve if that service prevents service to the other.ss
Two general problems arise under agency law with respect to
the trojan horse organizer question. The first involves the element
of control. Agency principles suggest that "ordinarily the control
which a master can properly exercise over the conduct of the servant would prevent simultaneous service for two independent persons. "59 Employers can argue that union organizers are not subject
to their control but to the union's, and that therefore such organizers are not agents of the employer under common law agency
principles. Section II.A, however, argues that employers lawfully
ance to the Restatement of Agency."); Kelley v. Southern Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 323-24 &
n.5 (1974).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 2(2) (1957).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 226 (1957) ("A person may be the servant of
two masters, not joint employers, at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not
involve abandonment of the service to the other.").
57. Id.§ 226 cmt. a (emphasis added). This definitional principle is related to the duty of
an agent "not to act or to agree to act during the period of his agency for persons whose
interests conflict with those of the principal in matters in which the agent is employed." Id.
§ 394. In addition, agency law requires that agents "act solely for the benefit of the principal
in all matters connected with [the] agency.", Id. § 387.
58. The question whether an individual is an employee or nonemployee under agency law
often arises in cases involving questions of respondeat superior liability. For example, a truck
driver involved in an accident may have been paid for his services at the time of the accident
by both the trucking company and the owner whose goods he was transporting. A court uses
agency principles to determine whether the trucking company, the owner of the goods, or
both, could be legally characterized as the truck driver's employer for purposes of liability
arising out of the accident. For examples of cases involving facts similar to these, see Sharpe
v. Bradley Lumber Co., 446 F.2d 152, 155 (4th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972),
and Mineo v. Tancini, 502 A.2d 1300, 1306 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). See also Oregon v. Tug GoGetter, 299 F. Supp. 269, 276 (D. Or. 1969) (holding both a tug owner and a barge owner
liable for a tug accident when the tug operator was subject to the partial control of the barge
owner), revd. on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1270 (1972).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 cmt. a (1957). Thus, in the example given
above, supra note 58, the owner of the goods might try to prove that the truck driver was not
subject to his control and therefore was not his agent under the law. Cf. Bailey v. MissouriKan.-Tex. Ry., 732 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting a plaintiff's attempt to
hold both his employer - a contractor - and the railroad that hired the contractor liable for
injuries).
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control these organizers with respect to every legitimate work task
the employer assigns.
The second general agency law problem for trojan horse organizers involves the prospect that an organizer's service to her
union conflicts with service to her employer.60 There are two ways
in which an organizer's service to her union might conflict with service to her employer. First, an employer might argue that his interest in maintaining a union-free workforce directly conflicts with the
interest of a union organizer in organizing the workforce. Section
II.B argues that the NLRA rejects this kind of conflict as a basis for
distinguishing employees from nonemployees. Second, an employer might argue that a union organizer has no interest in being a
good employee, only in organizing. Section II.C analyzes this question and concludes that its resolution depends on an empirical judgment. Part III then argues that this judgment is better suited to the
NLRB than to the judiciary.

A. The Problem of Control
Employers can challenge the status of trojan horse organizers as
agents under the common law by focusing on the fact that such organizers are, to some extent, controlled by the union while they
work for the nonunion employer. The Eighth Circuit relied in part
on this concern in refusing to enforce a Board order protecting trojan horse organizers:
[T]he union official will follow the mandates of the union, not his new
employer. If the union commands him to increase his organizational
activities at his second employer's expense, he will do so. If the union
asks him to quit working for his second employer, he will do so.61

Thus, the prospect that an employer could not fully control the actions of the organizer suggested to the court that the organizer
should not be considered an employee under agency principles.
But the problem of control does not represent a sound reason to
reject the claim that trojan horse organizers qualify as employees
under common law agency principles. A trojan horse organizer has
two jobs: one in service to the union and one in service to the em60. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. This Note uses conflict as a label for
what agency law describes as "an intent to serve one [that] necessarily excludes an intent to
serve the other." REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 226 cmt. a (1957). It is true, however, that conflict may imply less than a complete exclusion of service. In other words, even
with a conflict, one could still serve the other master, although perhaps less effectively.
Under agency law, however, agents have a duty to "act solely for the benefit of the principal
in all matters connected with [the] agency." Id. § 387. Combining the definition of conflict
with this duty, it is apparent that if service to one master requires any degradation of service
to the other, then the individual cannot establish an agency relationship with the second
master.
61. Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. granted,
115 s. Ct. 933 (1995).
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ployer. A union can only control an organizer with respect to the
organizer's efforts to unionize the workplace. The organizer is
otherwise subject to every legal demand an employer makes, and
the employer has every right to fire her for refusal to perform required work.62 As the NLRB has recognized, "If the organizer violates valid work rules, or fails to perform adequately, the organizer
lawfully may be subjected to the same nondiscriminatory discipline
as any other employee."63 Accordingly, as a matter of agency law,
it should not matter what degree of control the union exerts over
the organizer's union organizing efforts, as long as the organizer
does her work for the employer like every other employee.
B. Conflict of Interest in Union Organizing
Perhaps the most obvious kind of conflict that exists between
union organizers and employers is the interest in union organizing.
Many employers actively oppose the unionization of their employees,64 and many base their opposition on the claim that unionization harms their companies.65 The interest of these employers in
62. See, e.g., TRW, Inc. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1981} ("We decline to allow
an employee, whose work or attitude is unacceptable, to draw a protective mantle around
himself by espousing the union cause; Congress did not intend §§ 8(a}(l} and 8(a}(3} to provide a shield for the incompetent or job security for the unworthy."); Wellington Mill Div. v.
NLRB, 330 F.2d 579, 587 (4th Cir.) ("[T]he picture portrayed [in the record] is that of an
employee •.• who becomes so engrossed in union and antimanagement activities that he
neglects his job responsibilities. It is clear that an employer has the right to discharge any
employee under such circumstances, whether he be active in union organization or not."),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 882 (1964); cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941)
("The statute does not touch 'the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its
employees or to discharge them.' It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self-organization.'1}.
63. Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1230 (1992); see also 309 N.L.R.B. at 1230
n.36 ("Although employers lawfully may insist that employees adequately perform assigned
work, they cannot insist that employees forego organizing activities, or treat those activities
as 'disloyalty.'").
64.
Most American employers that do not employ unlawful tactics to prevent unionization clearly indicate their opposition to labor organizations. They disseminate literature
and make "captive audience" speeches to massed assemblages of employees stating their
unequivocal desire to remain nonunion. They emphasize the fact that only they possess
the power to determine wages, hours, and working conditions, and they frequently note
that if representative labor organizations strike to enforce union bargaining demands,
the striking individuals may be permanently replaced.
CHARI.Es B. CRAVER, CAN UNioNs SURVIVE? 49 (1993); see also MICHAEL GoIDFIELD, THE
DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 190-91 (1987) (discussing antiunion trade associations).
'
65. Employers commonly attack unionization campaigns with dire warnings about the
consequences of unionization on their companies. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 11213 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992); see, e.g., Benjamin Coal Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 572,
577 (1989) ("There is little basis for disputing the fact that survival, bankruptcy, plant closure,
and the loss of jobs were important 'bywords' of the campaign waged by Respondent against
union representation."); Harrison Steel Castings Co., 293 N.L.R.B. 1158, 11~9 (1989} (quoting company statement suggesting that unionization could lead to " 'loss of business and loss
of jobs'").
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operating their companies without a unionized workforce could not
be more plainly in conflict with the interest of union organizers in
unionizing the workforce.
The abiding principle of the NLRA, however, is that employees
may be strongly committed to union organization and still serve
their employers effectively. Section 1 of the NLRA, entitled "Findings and declaration of policy," states,
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they
have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers offull freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.66
This statutory language identifies union organization as a solution

to industrial problems, not a cause. As the NLRB has observed,
The statute's premise is at war with the idea that loyalty to a union is
incompatible with an employee's duty to the employer....
The statute is founded on the belief that an employee may legitimately give allegiance to both a union and an employer. To the extent that may appear to give rise to a conflict, it is a conflict that was
resolv.ed by Congress long since in favor of the right of employees to
organize.67

The Taft-Hartley amendments, which were passed in response to
the significant growth in union power in the wake of the original
NLRA, did not alter this fundamental philosophy. Taft-Hartley added some new restrictions on unions and new protections for employers,68 but it did not alter the law's central commitment to the
rights of employees to organize and to bargain collectively69 - a
commitment derived from the view that protection of the right to
organize provides a means of addressing workplace conflicts and
does not detract from management's legitimate powers.70
66. 29U.S.C.§151 (1988) (emphasis added).
67. Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1230 (1992).

68.
The new statute ••. shifted the emphasis of federal labor law. From an attitude of
federal protection for the rights of employees to organize into unions and to engage in
concerted economic activity and collective bargaining, the emphasis shifted to a more
balanced statutory scheme that added restrictions on unions and also guaranteed certain
freedoms of speech and conduct to employers and individual employees.
1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 65, at 39-40 (footnotes omitted).
69. Although Congress added important language to § 1 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1988), to highlight the new balance between union and employer rights, "Congress left unchanged the original commitment in the final paragraph of section 1." 1 THE DEVELOPING
LABoR LAw, supra note 65, at 40.
70. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 182 (1941) ("Protection of the workers'
right to self-organization does not curtail the appropriate sphere of managerial freedom; it
furthers the wholesome conduct of the business enterprise.").
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Thus, in utilizing agency principles to determine who constitutes
an employee under section 2(3), employers cannot argue that an individual's commitment to union organization - whether it is a
compensated commitment or not71 - conflicts with the employer's
interest in opposing union organization.12 This kind of conflict is
simply inconsistent with the central policies of the NLRA.73
C. The Problem of Incentives
The Eighth Circuit has concluded that a trojan horse organizer's
service to his union deprives him of the incentive necessary to serve
his nonunion employer satisfactorily.14 If an organizer is likely to
shirk because he lacks the proper incentives - or because his incentives are perverse - then he is not serving as an agent for his
nonunion master in a manner consistent with the definition of an
agent under the common law. The Eighth Circuit, for example,
speculated, "If [a trojan horse organizer] is terminated, he simply
returns to his full-time union job. Indeed, he may even relish being
discharged, because he then can file an unfair labor practice charge,
claiming that he was terminated because of his organizing efforts."75 Under this view, the organizer has less to lose by being
fired because his union position provides him with economic security, and therefore he may not work as hard as other employees. In
addition, trojan horse organizers might even have an affirmative incentive to seek discharge in order to file a charge against the employer under section 8(a)(3).76
71. The fact that trojan horse organizers are paid goes to a different kind of conflict the conflict over incentives. See infra section II.C. One commentator, however, rejects the
possibility of conflict on the basis of compensation but does not consider the problem of
incentives. See Tarver, supra note 13, at 1216 ("A paid organizer in the work force poses no
more threat to an employer's property rights ... than a pro-union employee.").
72. An employer might argue, however, that in applying agency principles one should do
so without reference to the policies of the Act. According to this argument, however, no
individual strongly committed to union organizing would be an employee under the statute,
because such an individual would always have an interest that conflicts with the employer.
The exclusion of employees interested in union organizing from a statute designed specifically to protect an employee's right to union organization would render almost the entire
statute nugatory.
73. One could put this argument in agency terms as well. An agent's duty to her employer extends only to matters connected with the agency. See supra note 57. Thus, an organizer's only duty to an employer who hires her to make widgets is to make widgets.
Although employers may argue that their interest is in making widgets with nonunion employees, the NLRA is founded on the view that an employee can serve both union and employer simultaneously. Thus, even when articulated in agency law terms, the argument
reduces to the same argument presented in the text.
74. See Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 933 (1995).
75. 34 F.3d at 629.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988); see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (describing
§ 8(a)(3) restrictions on employer actions).
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The NLRB, however, has specifically held that the incentives
actually work in the opposite direction. According to the Board,
[B]ecause the organizers seek access to the jobsite for organizational
purposes, engaging in conduct warranting discharge would be antithetical to their objective. No body of evidence has been presented
that would support any generalized, or specific, finding that paid
union organizers as a class have a significant, or indeed any, tendency
to engage in such conduct.77

In the Board's view, then, the threat of discharge is precisely what
ensures that organizers will actually be reliable employees - they
simply will not be able to meet employees and spread the union
message effectively if they lose their jobs. The Board considers trojan horse organizers employees under section 2(3) partly on the basis of its judgment that such organizers have no tendency to engage
in conduct warranting discharge.78
The conflict between the Eighth Circuit and the NLRB reveals
an important point unrecognized by courts and commentators that
have addressed this issue: the answer to the legal question whether
trojan horse organizers are employees under agency law ultimately
reduces to a purely empirical judgment about whether such organizers are likely to - or do in fact - shirk their job responsibilities. The Restatement of Agency provides no guidance for making
this judgment. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged in a re77. Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1230 (1992).
78. The Board's rule amounts to a presumption, based on the Board's expertise and experience, see infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text, that trojan horse organizers do not regularly engage in conduct justifying an employer's blanket refusal to hire them. One Board
member has suggested that the presumption is rebuttable and that the Board should use the
Wright Line proof structure for identifying anti-union discrimination under § 8(a)(3), see
supra note 7, in making§ 2(3) judgments about trojan horse organizers. See Sunland, 309
N.LR.B. at 1232-33 (Member Raudabaugh, concurring). For example, given the temporary
nature of the organizer's project, an employer seeking only long-term employees might have
interests inconsistent with those of the organizer. See 309 N.L.R.B. at 1232 ("[I]f an employer has a nondiscriminatory policy or practice of refusing to hire temporary employees, I
think it clear that the employer, acting pursuant to that policy or practice, could refuse to hire
someone who plans to work for the employer during an organizational drive and to leave
thereafter."). An employer aware of a given organizer's track record of shirking in favor of
organizing would also have a legitimate interest in not hiring that person. In addition, to the
extent that trojan horse organizers are not interested in organizing but simply in disrupting
the employer's business, see Northrup, supra note 4, at 471 (identifying disruption as the
principal goal for some trojan horse organizers), the employer has a legitimate interest in
refusing to hire them.
These concerns, however, provide no reason for the Board to make rebuttable its presumption that trojan horse organizers are employees under § 2(3), because nothing in the law
prevents employers from acting against employees on the basis of such concerns. Section
8(a)(3) does not prohibit employers from enforcing a legitimate rule against temporary hires,
nor does it prohibit employers from refusing to hire individuals known to shirk or who plan
to disrupt business. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. Section 8(a)(3) simply
prohibits employers from using such concerns as pretexts for union-based discrimination. In
short, nothing in the NLRA prevents an employer from taking an adverse action against a
trojan horse organizer so long as the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
taking the action.
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lated context, "In doubtful cases resort must still be had to economic and policy considerations to infuse § 2(3) with meaning. "79
In the case of trojan horse organizers, the relevant considerations
are those that will answer the question whether trojan horse organizers are good employees.so The next Part argues that resort to
such considerations is better taken by the NLRB than by the
judiciary.
ill.

DEFERENCE AND AGENCY LAW

This Part argues that courts should enforce NLRB orders involving trojan horse organizers on the ground that the Board has
the experience and expertise necessary to reach the proper legal
conclusion based on the principles of agency. Given the long history of Supreme Court deference to the Board's experience and expertise in applying the terms of the Act to the complex problems of
industrial life, the only obstacle to deference in the context of section 2(3) is that the provision itself seems to limit the Board's authority. This Part demonstrates that an important role still exists
for the Board in interpreting section 2(3) because the proper interpretation of employee under agency law depends on a judgment
that requires experience and expertise unique to the NLRB.
The Supreme Court generally defers to the administrative expertise and experience of the Board in applying the broad strictures
of the NLRA to the complex relations between employers and unions. According to the Court, deference is justified because of the
NLRB's "special function of applying the general provisions of the
Act to the complexities of industrial life, and of [appraising] carefully the interests of both sides of any labor-management controversy in the diverse circumstances of particular cases from its
special understanding of the actualities of industrial relations. "81 In
addition, the Court has repeatedly observed,
Because it is to the Board that Congress entrusted the task of 'applying the Act's general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite
combinations of events which might be charged as violative of its
terms,' that body, if it is to accomplish the task which Congress set for
79. Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, Inc., 404 U.S. 157, 168 (1971).
80. The phrase good employees in this context means employees who work as hard as
other employees.
81. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S.
483, 501 (1978) ("[I]n many ••• contexts of labor policy, '[t]he ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate
national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review.'"
(quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 'if!, 96 (1957))).
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it, necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices of the broad statutory provisions.82

In general, because of the Board's experience in administering the
Act, the Court accords Board rules "considerable deference."83
But section 2(3) is unlike most other provisions of the NLRA in
that it specifically requires the courts to take an active role to ensure that the Board's interpretations of employee are consistent
with common law principles. As noted above, Congress passed the
Taft-Hartley amendment to section 2(3) specifically to ensure that
courts did not allow the Board to ignore common law principles
when determining which individuals are employees under the Act.84
In other words, although Congress assigned to the Board the general responsibility to "develop and apply fundamental national labor policy,"85 Congress apparently intended to restrict the Board's
authority to do so in the context of section 2(3), by requiring that
the provision be interpreted according to common law agency
principles.
Yet even if the meaning of section 2(3) is a "legal" question of
agency that courts are generally competent to assess,86 specific aspects of that judgment may nevertheless require experience with
the "diverse circumstances" and the "actualities" of industrial relationsB7 - experience long recognized as unique to the NLRB.88
The question whether trojan horse organizers are employees under
the common law depends on important empirical judgments about
82. Beth Israel, 431 U.S. at 500-01 (quoting Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793, 798 (1945)); see also NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990)
(quoting passage in text).
83. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 786; see Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB,
482 U.S. 27, 42 (1987) ("The Board, of course, is given considerable authority to interpret the
provisions of the NLRA."); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96
(1957). But cf. NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192, 202 (1986)
(noting broad scope of deference but refusing to defer). See generally 2 THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAw, supra note 65, at 1890-93 (describing judicial deference to the NLRB). Because the NLRB operates through a process of adjudication rather than rulemaking, the
phrase Board rules in this context simply refers to approaches or interpretations the Board
applies to cases that it decides.
84. See supra note 53.
85. Beth Israel, 437 U.S. at 500.
86. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (refusing to defer to the INS
because the question at issue was a "pure question of statutory construction"); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493 (1947) (refusing to give deference on a "naked
question of law").
87. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 {1963).
88. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. The relative number of cases heard by
the NLRB, as compared to the federal courts, starkly reveals the NLRB's unique position
with respect to factual judgments about unions, employees, and employers. In FY 1993, for
example, the NLRB "received" 33,744 cases involving unfair labor practices. See 58 NLRB
.ANN. REP. 107 tbl. 1 (1994). By contrast, the federal courts of appeals decided a total of only
179 "petitions for review and/or enforcement" of Board orders. Id. at 164 tbl. 19.
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the employment behavior of such organizers.s9 The NLRB has concluded that organizers generally do not engage in conduct warranting discharge and thus do not act in ways contrary to the legally
recognized interests of their employers.90 This empirical judgment
clearly depends on knowledge of the diverse circumstances and actualities of industrial relations, which suggests that courts should
defer to Board orders protecting trojan horse organizers as employees under section 2(3).
In NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America,91 the Supreme
Court essentially endorsed this view of the Board's role in interpreting section 2(3). The Court in United Insurance upheld an
NLRB order finding that an insurance company's debit agents were
employees and not independent contractors. The Court observed
that it is not obvious under the common law whether a particular
individual is an employee or an independent contractor, and stated
that "[w]hat is important is that the total factual context is assessed
in light of the pertinent common-law agency principles."92 The
Court further noted,
The Board examined all [the] facts and found that they showed the
debit agents to be employees. This was not a purely factual finding by
the Board, but involved the application of law to facts - what do the
facts establish under the common law of agency: employee or independent contractor?93

The Court held that it was error for the court below to have refused
to defer to the Board's judgment, because the Board had already
assessed the facts through hearing and argument and had reached a
judgment "between two fairly conflicting views."94
United Insurance strongly supports deference to the Board's interpretation of section 2(3) in the trojan horse organizer context.
As in United Insurance, the Board's judgment that trojan horse organizers are employees is not a purely factual finding. Rather, it
involves an application of law to facts - what do the facts about
conflicts between union organizers and employers establish under
the common law of agency: employee or nonemployee? According
to the NLRB, the facts show that organizers generally perform required work for their employers; under agency law, these facts
make paid union organizers employees.9s
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.

390 U.S. 254 (1968).
390 U.S. at 258.
390 U.S. at 260.
390 U.S. at 260.
95. The Court's opinion in United Insurance suggests another reason courts should defer
to the Board's conclusion about trojan horse organizers. Although the Court ultimately held
that deference to the Board was appropriate for the reasons set out in the text, the Court in
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The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Town & Country Electric, Inc. v.
NLRB96 provides a useful counterpoint to this analysis. Instead of
deferring in any respect to the Board's experience with unionmanagement conflicts, the Town & Country court applied agency
principles97 de novo9s and concluded that "an inherent conflict of
interest exists" between a union organizer and the employer.99 The
court's central factual claim with respect to this conflict was that
trojan horse organizers lacked sufficient incentive - that is, the
threat of losing a paying job - to work hard.100 The essence of thi9
analysis is that trojan horse organizers are not employees as a matter of law because their interests conflict with employers as a matter
of one fact: that organizers do not work as hard as other
employees.
Aside from its questionable accuracy, the principal problem
with this analysis is that i~ flatly ignores the traditional role of the
Board in making judgments about conflicts between unions and
employers. The question of whether trojan horse organizers are
likely to work as hard as other employees is precisely the kind of
question that calls upon the NLRB's considerable experience with
issues of union organizing in the workplace. Rather than substitute
their own judgments .about the relationship between organizers and
employers, courts should respect the Board's expertise in and experience with regulating that relationship and enforce Board orders
protecting trojan horse organizers as employees under section
2(3).101
United Insurance suggested one reason deference may not be appropriate in such a case: the
"detennination of pure agency law" at issue in the case - whether insurance debit agents
are employees or independent contractors - "involved no special administrative expertise
that a court does not possess." 390 U.S. at 260. The determination of whether trojan horse
organizers can be expected to be good employees, on the other hand, does involve the special
administrative expertise of the NLRB.
96. 34 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 933 (1995).
97. See 34 F.3d at 628 (quoting REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§§ 387, 394 (1957)).
98. The Town & Country court did not acknowledge the possibility that the NLRB could
have a role in applying agency principles to the facts at issue. Noting that "[s]ection 2(3)'s
definition of 'employee[]' provides little help in deciding the issue," 34 F.3d at 628 (footnote
omitted), the court stated that "when a federal statute does not helpfully define the term
'employee,' we infer that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine,'' 34 F.3d at 628 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The court then proceeded with a de novo review of the
applicable common law agency principles. See 34 F.3d at 628-29.
99. 34 F.3d at 629.
100. 34 .F.3d at 629.
101. There is one situation in which the Board has implied that trojan horse organizers
may not be employees under § 2(3). In Sunlan,d Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224 (1992), the
Board held that "an employer should not be required during a strike to hire a paid organizer
whose role is inherently and unmistakably inconsistent with employment behind a picket
line." 309 N.L.R.B. at 1229 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Board observed:
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CONCLUSION

Unions organize in a hostile world. Employers, of course, generally hate them,102 but more problematic for unions is the suspicion and distrust with which employees themselves may initially
view unions.103 Union organizing is in part a constant struggle to
build relationships with employees in order to overcome this distrust. Unions know they cannot build trust through billboards, leaflets, and faceless phone calls alone. Unions may increasingly
consider sending in organizers to work side by side and day by day
with employees in order to overcome latent barriers and convince
employees of the value of union representation.
But courts and the NLRB itself are divided over whether the
law requires employers to tolerate this organizing strategy. These
authorities are also divided over whether the question is one primarily for the Board to answer or whether courts must find the answer in the statute itself. This Note has argued that the
determination of whether trojan horse organizers are employees
In our experience, when a company is struck it is not "business as usual." The union and
employer are in an economic battle in which the union's legitimate objective is to shut
down the employer in order to force it to accede to the union's demands. The employer's equally legitimate goal is usually to resist by continuing production, often with
nonunit employees, nonstrikers, and replacements. Thus, an employer faced with a
strike can take steps aimed at protecting itself from economic injury. For example, an
employer can permanently replace the strikers, it can lock out the unit employees and it
can hire temporary replacements for the locked-out employees. Consistent with these
principles, we believe that the employer can refuse to hire, during the dispute, an agent
of the striking union.
309 N.L.R.B. at 1230-31 (footnotes omitted).
It is unclear, however, whether the Board is distinguishing between a strike and a nonstrike situation in a manner that is relevant to agency law. In fact, it is the conclusion that the
refusal to hire a trojan horse organizer does not violate§ 8(a)(3) - not that a trojan horse
organizer is not an employee under § 2(3) - that underlies this aspect of the Sunland opinion. As the Board stated:
The Respondent plainly engaged in discriminatory conduct in refusing to hire Creeden
because of his status as a paid organizer of the union..•• [GJ.iven the conflict between an
employer's interest ..• in operating during a strike and a striking union's evident interest
in persuading employees not to help it operate, we find that the Respondent has a "substantial and legitimate" business justification for declining to hire a paid agent of the
Union for the duration of the strike.
309 N.L.R.B. at 1231. Sunland does not really represent a "strike exception" to § 2{3)'s definition but rather a decision of substantive law under§ 8(a)(3) that during a strike employers
may permissibly discriminate against employees who are also paid union organizers.
Note, however, that an interpretation of§ 2(3) that excludes trojan horse organizers during strikes is not inconceivable. For example, it is possible that during strikes trojan horse
organizers typically disrupt production, or threaten strikebreakers, or take other similar actions designed to undermine the employer's operations. In such cases, the employer's interest in operating his facility would conflict with the organizer's interest in shutting down the
facility and would thereby mean that the organizer could not be an agent of the employer. If
the Board were to conclude that such behavior is in fact typical, then the Board could establish a presumption that during strikes trojan horse organizers do not qualify as employees
under § 2(3).
102. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text
103. See Seymour M. Lipset, Labor Unions in the Public Mind, in UNIONS IN TRANsmoN
287 (Seymour M. Lipset ed., 1986) (discussing public perceptions of unions).
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under NLRA section 2(3) ultimately reduces to a single question whether trojan horse organizers are generally good employees. Judicial deference to the Board on this question is not a matter of
statutory ambiguity. It is a matter of acknowledging the Board's
experience with union organizers, employees, and employers. The
Board has answered the question whether trojan horse organizers
are generally good employees in the affirmative. Courts should defer to that judgment.

